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Abstract
The growing incorporation of artificial neural net-
works (NNs) into many fields, and especially into
life-critical systems, is restrained by their vulnera-
bility to adversarial examples (AEs). Some exist-
ing defense methods can increase NNs’ robustness,
but they often require special architecture or train-
ing procedures and are irrelevant to already trained
models. In this paper, we propose a simple de-
fense that combines feature visualization with in-
put modification, and can, therefore, be applicable
to various pre-trained networks. By reviewing sev-
eral interpretability methods, we gain new insights
regarding the influence of AEs on NNs’ computa-
tion. Based on that, we hypothesize that informa-
tion about the “true” object is preserved within the
NN’s activity, even when the input is adversarial,
and present a feature visualization version that can
extract that information in the form of relevance
heatmaps. We then use these heatmaps as a basis
for our defense, in which the adversarial effects are
corrupted by massive blurring. We also provide a
new evaluation metric that can capture the effects
of both attacks and defenses more thoroughly and
descriptively, and demonstrate the effectiveness of
the defense and the utility of the suggested evalua-
tion measurement with VGG19 results on the Ima-
geNet dataset.
1 Introduction
Artificial neural networks (NNs) have been recently related
to several breakthroughs in artificial intelligence tasks. How-
ever, their computational process usually involves millions
of parameters and was initially considered inaccessible and
uninterpretable to humans. This unintuitive nature of com-
putation may lead to unpredicted (“Clever Hans”) mistakes,
and may also give rise to different kinds of adversarial at-
tacks. Such attacks produce adversarial examples (AEs)
where small malicious changes, usually undetectable by hu-
mans, lead NNs to output wrong decisions with high confi-
dence [Szegedy et al., 2013]. In this work we suggest using
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visualization techniques, originally created as a tool for NN
interpretability, in ways that: 1) provide a new perspective
on the nature of AEs’ impact; 2) can be utilized for a new
and simple defense technique against adversarial attacks. Ad-
ditionally, in order to evaluate our defense we introduce an
evaluation metric that enables more informative analysis of
the quality of both attacks and defenses.
1.1 AE Explanations and Defenses
Common explanations of the AE phenomenon focus on the
failure of the models to map correctly the entire input space
to the output space [Tabacof and Valle, 2016]. This can also
be due to the linear nature of the computation, where small
initial perturbations accumulate through the layers to cause
significant deviations [Goodfellow et al., 2014]. On the other
hand, other researchers put the blame on the non-linear pro-
cesses or the high dimensionality of the input [Bhagoji et
al., 2017], while others argue that AEs occur where the de-
cision boundary of the models lies close to the data mani-
fold [Tanay and Griffin, 2016]. A different approach relates
the existence of AEs to non-robust features that exist in stan-
dard datasets [Ilyas et al., 2019].
Side by side with the attempts to explain AEs, many
defense strategies have been proposed in order to increase
the robustness of NNs against such attacks. Akhtar and
Mian [2018] sorted those defenses along three main direc-
tions: 1) using modified training or modified input; 2) mod-
ifying the network by adding special layers or changing the
loss/activation functions; and 3) using external models as net-
work add-ons during classification. Though effective, the
above methods as well as other methods do not provide a
complete defense against AEs. Many of them have been eval-
uated with only a very specific attack type or under particular
parameters, and fail when encountering different or stronger
AEs [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b], or when considering the
worst-case of limited or even perfect-knowledge attacks [Car-
lini and Wagner, 2017a]. Moreover, many of the proposed de-
fenses require extra computations and special training or ar-
chitecture. Therefore even the relatively successful defenses
may not be relevant to already trained models, or to tasks that
require quick decisions or complex and sophisticated model-
ing.
In the current research, we seek for a simple and fast
method, in terms of both implementation and computational
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resources, to detect AEs. In order for this method to be ap-
plicable to different types of NNs, the defense should not re-
quire a special architecture or changes to the (already trained)
network’s parameters. A natural direction is to modify the
input during testing, in a way that cancels-out the subtle ad-
versarial perturbations. Previous such methods, like feature
squeezing [Xu et al., 2018], have been shown to be highly
successful in black-box scenarios where the attacker is un-
aware of the defense. However, they can be broken easily
when the input-modification is taken into account while at-
tacking [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a]. Of course, the defender
can respond by increasing the protective distortion level of
the defense, but this will eventually lead to a decrease in the
performance of the network in general, since benign inputs
will become unrecognizable as well.
1.2 Feature Visualization
At this point we take advantage of the progress made in a
parallel line of research, called feature (or network) visualiza-
tion [Olah et al., 2017], which aims to understand NN com-
putation and make NNs more interpretable. Specifically, sev-
eral methods have been proposed for highlighting the input
features which contribute to the network’s decisions. Three
main approaches to this end are: 1) input modification meth-
ods, which observe how changing the input to a NN affects
the output; 2) class activation mapping methods, which com-
bine activation patterns of a specific (usually high-level) layer
with additional information such as the output and the gradi-
ents; and 3) back-propagation based methods, which are at
the focus of the current work.
Back propagation based methods basically aim at reversing
the inference process of the network. For example, Layer-
wise Relevance Propagation (LRP) [Bach et al., 2015] prop-
agates the final prediction backwards to the input in order
to single-out the most influential components (e.g. pixels).
Namely, the classification decision is decomposed into pixel-
wise relevance scores, according to a conservation principle
which forces the relevance quantity to be preserved between
layers. Different reverse propagation rules have been sug-
gested, as reflected in different variants of LRP such as LRP-
, LRP-α1β0 and LRP-γ [Montavon et al., 2019]. However,
the most basic attribution rule can be defined as:
R
(l)
i =
∑
j
zij
zj
R
(l+1)
j (1)
where zij = xiwij and R(l) is the relevance of the lth layer.
When restricted to the positive input spaces, this rule can be
interpreted and theoretically explained as deep Tylor decom-
position (DTD) of the ReLU activations [Montavon et al.,
2017].
Though robust against gradient shattering and resulting in
fine-detailed heatmaps, the DTD method was shown to be
instance-specific but not class-discriminative [Gu et al., 2018]
– the generated maps recognize foreground objects, but those
maps are almost identical independently of the target class
information. Following this, CLRP [Gu et al., 2018] and
SGLRP [Iwana et al., 2019] have been developed in order to
better specify the input features which trigger different out-
put neurons. According to Gu et al. [2018], the patterns of
positively activated neurons are determined by (and hence
also back-propagated to) the pixels on salient edges of the
image, independently of the target class. The reverse prop-
agation of different categories differs, however, in the exact
relevance values that are assigned to the neurons. Based on
that, the CLRP method utilizes the relative difference in rel-
evance values of LRP maps of the same image for different
categories as a tool for locating discriminative input features.
SGLRP [Iwana et al., 2019] differs from the above CLRP
method in the way it determines and distributes the initial rel-
evance scores, where the post-softmax probabilities are used
to weight non-target neurons in proportion to their contribu-
tion to the propagated heatmap rather than weighting them
with a fixed value. Both CLRP and SGLRP methods result
in class-discriminative features that mainly consist of contour
lines that are relevant to the target class.
We aim to harness the expressive nature of the above tech-
niques for a better understanding of the influence of AEs on
the network computational process. If these methods can re-
veal the input features that contribute to the decision made by
the network, what will those features look like when the input
is adversarial?
1.3 Visualization Techniques and AEs
Several studies have investigated the effect of AEs on visu-
alization of features. Xu et al. [2019] used different visual-
ization techniques to provide pixel-wise analysis of the ad-
versarial effects. Xiao et al. [2018] used CAM to show how
the attention of the network shifts to irrelevant regions of AE,
and interpreted this as an indication of the attack’s effective-
ness. Dong et al. [2017] used discrepancy maps to show
how AEs differ from benign input, and proposed adversarial
training scheme which incorporates consistency loss between
true and adversarial maps in the objective function. The dif-
ference between adversarial and benign saliency maps was
also explored by Gu and Tresp [2019]. Finally, Chalasani et
al. [2018] show that adversarially trained networks tend to
produce sparser and more concise explanations when using
the Integrated Gradients method.
2 LRP-based Methods and AEs
We present herein results of LRP-based methods on AEs,
starting with some new insights achieved when using exist-
ing techniques, followed by the introduction of a novel LRP-
based version.
2.1 Class Discriminative Heatmaps of AEs
When applying class-discriminative methods to AEs, the ef-
fect of the attacks on the networks’ decision making can
be clearly visualized [Dong et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2018;
Gu and Tresp, 2019]. However, the previous works have
either only stated that the focus of the heatmap changes
as a result of an attack [Xiao et al., 2018; Gu and Tresp,
2019], or showed that for misclassification attacks, where
the target class is very similar to the original classified
class, the heatmap focuses more on features shared by both
classes [Dong et al., 2017]. We show here that the same phe-
nomenon can surprisingly be observed also for strong attacks
where the target class is very different from the original one.
Figure 1 presents three such examples, where the heatmaps
of the adversarial images resemble objects from the adver-
sarial target classes. These findings are not trivial, since one
could speculate that for weak attacks, where misclassification
is sufficient by itself, the attacks would enhance available fea-
tures of an image that correspond to the non-primary classes.
Strong target-class attacks, on the other hand, should require
a different deceiving strategy, since the target class’ features
are not present in the original image. Explanations for such
attacks, as was mentioned in Subsection 1.1, usually involve
more abstract and general aspects of NN computation such
as “unmapped islands” in the input space. The current re-
sults suggest that for at least some of the strong attacks, the
same strategy of enhancing non-target human-wise features
still applies.
Hotdog → Mantis 
Green Snake → Baseball
Freight Car → Wooden Spoon
SGLRP Heatmap
CLRP Heatmap
CLRP Heatmap
Figure 1: Visualization of the adversarial effect on the network’s de-
cision neuron. The left column presents AEs created using Carlini-
Wagner (CW) Attack (first row) and LBFGS Attack (second and
third row). In the middle column are heatmaps produced for the pre-
dicted (adversarial) categories, and at the right column are examples
from the ImageNet validation set of the adversarial objects.
As was discussed by Iwana et al. [2019], the above meth-
ods do not always provide heatmaps as expected. Neverthe-
less, for the given examples, the adversarial effect can be in-
terpreted as simply shifting of the network’s attention from
the principal features of the true object to the target (more
peripheral) features. A more fundamental insight from this
discussion is that the information about the different classes
and their corresponding features exists in the inference pro-
cess of both benign and adversarial inputs. The difference
in the final decisions is a result of the way these features are
weighted and prioritized.
2.2 Absolute Value Heatmaps for Primary Class
Specification
Motivated by the above observations, we hypothesize that the
network preserves the knowledge of the “true” classification
even though its actual output is incorrect. As stressed by Gu
et al. [2018; 2019], the class-specific information can be ex-
tracted from the saliency/relevance values assigned to the pix-
els rather than from the filtering effect itself. Previous works
utilized this fact to generate class discriminative heatmaps by
comparing relevance values between heatmaps of different
categories. However, the fact that the discriminative pixels
are relatively higher suggests that information about classes
hides within the absolute relevance values as well.
Specifically, we observe that the heatmap pixels with the
highest absolute values, no matter which output neuron was
that heatmap reverse-propagated for, belong to the primary
object in the input image. This also applies even when the
image is adversarial; when reverse-propagating the relevance
of the target class, the pixels with the highest absolute rele-
vance scores in the resulting heatmap still belong to the (true)
primary object in that image. Figure 2 presents how such
primary class heatmaps are almost identical for different out-
put neurons given some input image, as well as for the target
neurons of different AEs which are based on that same im-
age. The heatmaps were created by first reverse-propagating
the one-hot encoding of the desired output neuron, using the
standard DTD method [Montavon et al., 2017], and then bi-
narizing the pixels of the heatmap so that only the top 5% of
the pixels are preserved:
Pi =
{
1 Pi > p¯+ 2 · sp
0 otherwise
(2)
where p¯ and sp are the heatmap pixels’ mean and standard
deviation, respectively.
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Figure 2: Our new method produces similar heatmaps for both be-
nign and adversarial categories. First column: AEs created us-
ing untargeted CW and targeted LBFGS attacks. Second and third
columns: heatmaps for the original (benign) image’s top-1 predic-
tion and for another randomly selected prediction among the top-5
predictions, respectively. Forth and fifth columns: heatmaps for the
AE’s top-1 prediction and for another randomly selected prediction
among the top-5 predictions, respectively.
3 Heat and Blur
Following the previous section, we now have a tool to high-
light the pixels of the “true” objects in both benign and
AEs. We suggest using this knowledge in the following “heat
and blur” defense procedure, which is summarized in Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Heat and Blur
Input: An image i
Parameter: Blurring factor pblur
Output: A “cleaned” image ic
1: Input the image to the model and get the output y(i).
2: Obtain the heatmap hi = LRP(y(i)).
3: Use Equation 2 to get the binarized heatmap b hi.
4: Blur the original image i using a Gaussian filter with σ =
pblur to obtain ic.
5: Restore the original pixels that correspond to the entries
of b hi and plant them in the blurred image ic.
6: return ic
In this method, we first input a suspicious image to a pre-
trained model in order to obtain a heatmap of the primary
object outlines, as was described in section 3.2. Then we sig-
nificantly modify the image (in this case, using a Gaussian
filter) to guarantee the cancellation of adversarial perturba-
tions, which are by definition restricted in their amplitude in
order to remain below human detection level. The resultant
image is not adversarial, but may still be misclassified due to
the massive distortion. Then, we restore the original values
of the pixels that belong only to the heatmap from step 1. In
this way, the contour lines of the ”true” object are sharp and
that object stands out, while the background remains blurry.
It is important to preserve the background to some degree,
since the texture and colors contribute to the decision mak-
ing of the network, but the fine details are insignificant for
the classification task. The modified image is then used as
a new input for the final decision (see Figure 3 for a visual
demonstration).
Figure 3: Demonstration of the Heat and Blur method. From left to
right: a) AE where ‘Rhodesian ridgeback’ is misclassified as ‘Egyp-
tian cat’; b) the blurred AE with σ = 1; c) the recovered pixels
according to the binarized heatmap; d) the ‘cleaned’ image is now
classified as ‘Rhodesian ridgeback’
We find that the above method is very efficient in “clear-
ing” images from adversarial effects, with the cost of a mod-
erate decrease in the network’s performance on benign im-
ages. The balance between accuracy for benign (or cleaned)
images and susceptibility to AEs is controlled by the σ pa-
rameter, which determines the blurring degree (Figure 4). It
requires two forward and one backward passes, which are
computationally efficient when using designated platforms of
deep learning. However, we recognize that using the tradi-
tional top-1 accuracy measure is not sufficiently informative
as an evaluation metric.
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Figure 4: Effect of the σ blurring parameter on the accuracy of be-
nign inputs (solid blue line), LBFGS AEs with respect to the true
label (red dotted line) and adversarial terget category (black dashed
line), and on the l∞ distance from the original input (green dash-
dotted line) in the normalized [0, 1] space. The region of l∞ dis-
tance below the commonly used threshold of 0.031 is marked with
green background
4 Evaluation Measurements
Even though it is currently the most common measurement
for the success of both attacks and defenses, top-1 accuracy
answers the very limited question of “did the NN classified
the input as the exact correct label?”. This way, misclassifi-
cation of ‘tiger shark’ as ‘white shark’ is equivalently wrong
as misclassifying ‘tiger shark’ as ‘broom’, for example. Even
the top-5 accuracy measure does not always capture the whole
classification picture, since it only informs of whether the cor-
rect label appeared in those top-5 predictions, but does not
indicate where it is located within those predictions, or how
far it is from their semantic neighbourhood. There could be
many applications where this distinction is important, for ex-
ample if one wants to visually identify weapons in an image
for security reasons, and an attacker masks weapons as ani-
mals. In this case, it does not matter if a defense strategy turns
the adversarial ‘animal’ into one kind of weapon or another,
as long as the object is now identified as a threat. Alterna-
tively, many attacks only switch between the top-k (where k
is small) predictions of the model, which in many cases is not
necessarily a wrong classification per say. Many images con-
sist of several objects, for example an image labelled as ‘har-
vester’ while there also appears ‘hay’ in it. A top-1 classifica-
tion of that image as ‘hay’ provides true information regard-
ing the content of that image, even though the correct label of
‘harvester’ only appears as the second highest prediction due
to the attack. On the other hand, other attacks may entirely
change the semantic neighborhood of the top k predictions,
but this dramatic and more fundamental change is currently
unaccounted for. To summarize, the current top-k accuracy
metric does not express the semantic and conceptual gap be-
tween the correct and adversarial predictions, while this may
be valuable information in many use-cases.
We therefore suggest modifying a measure of the rank-
ing quality that is widely used in Information Retrieval
literature, called Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain
(NDCG) [Croft et al., 2010]. This measure was originally
designed to apply graded relevance scores to results of search
engines, based on the position of each element in the results
list. We propose to use the pre- and post-softmax predic-
tions of the model for a benign input as a source for rele-
vance scores and as an ideal grading, by which attack and
defense results should be normalized. Specifically, a set of
post-softmax predictions
∑N
j=1 p
(ib)
j for a specific benign in-
put ib will be scored as follows:
R(ib)pj =

l
(ib)
j∑
i l
(ib)
i
j ≤ K1
0 otherwise
(3)
where lj is the pre-softmax value of output neuron j, K1 =
max
k
∑k
j=1
p
(ib)
j ≤ Cb andCb = [0, 1] is a parameter chosen
as the prediction coverage. For example, for Cb = 0.9, only
the k highest predictions that sum up to 0.9 will be scored
according to their original pre-softmax normalized value, and
all the other N − k predictions will be zeros. These scores
will be used as relevance scores for the AE ia (or alternatively
the cleaned image ic) that was created on the basis of ib:
R(ia)pj =
{
R
(ib)
pjmatch
j ≤ K2
0 otherwise
(4)
where pjmatch is the prediction within the ib output that
corresponds to the category of pj (note that this predic-
tion is not necessarily located in the jth place), and K2 =
max
k
∑k
j=1
p
(ia)
j ≤ Ca with the parameter Ca = [0, 1].
The discounted cumulative gain of the predictions for an
image i is given by:
DCG(i)k =
k∑
j=1
2
R(i)pj − 1
log(1 + j)
(5)
and the normalized DCG is defined as:
NDCG(i)K =
DCG(i)k
IDCG
(6)
where we define IDCG as the ideal DCG given by the predic-
tions for the benign image. Therefore the normalized DCGk
for an AE ia is calculated as:
NDCG(ia)K2 =
DCG(ia)K2
DCG(ib)K1
(7)
5 Experimental Evaluation
The experiments were conducted using VGG19 architecture
with the ImageNet validation dataset. They include only be-
nign images which were correctly classified by the model,
and successfully applied AEs. For each randomly selected
image, an adversarial counterpart was created using the Fool-
box1 toolbox [Rauber et al., 2017]. The applied attacks con-
sisted of l2 bounded targeted and untargeted Carlini-Wagner
(CW), targeted LBFGS and untargeted boundary attacks. For
the targeted attacks, the target category was randomly se-
lected, and the l2 distance threshold was set to 0.02. The
suggested defense procedure was based on the LRP method
using the Innvestigate2 toolbox [Alber et al., 2019], and the
threshold for the heatmap mask was empirically chosen to be
the top 5% of the LRP heatmap pixels. The blurring of the
rest of the images was achieved using a Gaussian filter with
σ between [0.8, 1.2]. Each experimental group consisted of
500-800 couples of benign and adversarial images except for
the boundary attack group with 175 couples, and the coverage
parameterC in the NDCG method was set to 0.99 for both be-
nign and adversarial images. The heatmaps in Figure 1 were
created using the code provided by [Iwana et al., 2019]3.
5.1 Evaluation of Heat and Blur as a Defense
We used the NDCG measure to evaluate the effectiveness of
our suggested defense procedure against four different attack
types. As can be observed in Figure 5, the different attacks
have a varying effect on the predictions of the model. For
example, the top-1 accuracy of both targeted and untargeted
AEs is 0, but these groups’ top category NDCG scores are
very different; while the targeted attacks cause the model to
classify the AE as a random (and usually unrelated) class and
hence the NDCG score is very close to 0, the untargeted at-
tacks often directs the model to a category within the top-
k predictions of the original benign counterpart, as reflected
in the NDCG score of ∼0.5. This higher score captures the
fact that the misclassification is not always so dramatic and
sometimes not even wrong, especially in cases where the in-
put consists of several objects or can suffer several possible
interpretations. The sharp increase of the untargeted AEs
graphs is another indication of an attack strategy that often
only switches the location of the top category, while the slow
and incomplete rise of the targeted attacks’ graph shows how
these attacks completely change the relationships and seman-
tic neighborhood of the top-k categories. The effectiveness of
our defense also varies, though it can be observed that it suc-
cessfully recovers the correct context of the predictions, even
when the top-1 accuracy is limited. Also note that for the con-
trol benign group, the NDCG scores are higher and relatively
consistent across the different experimental groups, whereas
the top-1 accuracy measure is more sensitive to noise.
5.2 Adaptive Attacks
Since some of the pixels remain untouched, one can argue
that an adaptive attack is still possible, where perturbations
are only applied to the heatmap pixels of the “true” object. In
this way, the defense will fail to clear the adversarial effect
and the network will still misclassify the image. In order to
explore this possibility, we created a set of new attacks that
indeed consist of perturbations to the top-5% pixels alone (see
1https://github.com/bethgelab/foolbox
2https://github.com/albermax/innvestigate
3https://github.com/uchidalab/softmaxgradient-lrp
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Figure 5: Average NDCG scores for the 5 highest predictions of the model, compared between AEs (‘Adv’), AEs after our method was
applied (‘Cleaned’) and cleaned benign images (‘Control’). Top-1 accuracy results for each group are presented in the legends.
Algorithm 2 for the detailed procedure). We used several at-
tack types such as CW or PGD, and found that constraining
the possible perturbations to such a small portion of the im-
age pixels has a dramatic impact on the attack process. If
the perturbation size is not strictly defined, the resultant per-
turbations are above the human detection threshold. When
trying to apply attacks with l∞- or l2-norm bounded pertur-
bations, the algorithm usually fails to find an attack (we have
succeeded in less than 1% of the attempts). In addition, all the
AEs that we have managed to produce have been (wrongly)
classified by the network with low confidence and into a se-
mantically related class. We believe that further refinements
of our suggested defense, combined with more thorough anal-
ysis of the vulnerable pixels that belong to the heatmap, will
help circumvent even the few currently successful attacks.
Algorithm 2 Adaptive Attack
Input: An image i, an attack method Att(.)
Parameter: Number of iterations iter
Output: An adaptive AE iadapt or ∅
1: itemp = i
2: for iter iterations do
3: iadv = Att(itemp)
4: hmap mask = binarized heatmap(itemp)
5: itemp[hmap mask] = iadv[hmap mask]
6: iadapt = clip(itemp) to be in the allowed pixel range
7: if iadapt is adversarial then
8: return iadapt
9: else
10: itemp = iadapt
11: end if
12: end for
13: return ∅
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The above results exemplify how interpretation methods such
as LRP can be used for defense against AEs. We chose to fo-
cus on LRP since this method is computationally efficient and
conceptually straightforward, and does not require many as-
sumptions and hyperparameters tuning. Using a Gaussian fil-
ter for the defensive distortion is not essential and other types
of randomized noise or input transformations may give com-
parable or even better results, as the connection between ad-
versarial and corruption robustness was thoroughly explored
by Ford et al. [2019]. The choice of the 5% highest pixels
for localization of the primary object, though empirically ef-
fective, has some limitations. The relevance heatmaps are
sometimes rather sparse, especially in cases where the model
predictions are vague, and as a result the top 5% pixels may
be too diluted. A more sophisticated determination of the
percentage of pixels to restore may improve the classifica-
tion accuracy of those cases. Overall, the simplicity of the
suggested method could enhance its robustness, as will be
discussed below, and it could also facilitate integration with
other defenses. For example, scanning of the restored pixels
for statistically atypical values, or defending against possible
attacks on the interpretation method itself.
Recent studies have demonstrated that interpretability
methods may also be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. For
example, it was shown that saliency methods are sometimes
sensitive to input transformations such as adding a constant
to the input [Kindermans et al., 2019], however the results
are less relevant to our defense since the highest-valued pix-
els of the attacked heatmaps seem to remain intact. In the
work of Zhang et al. [2018], it was shown that pixel manip-
ulation can indeed produce wrong interpretation heatmaps,
but their method was not tested against LRP-based methods.
The authors have, however, showed that the transferability
of AEs across different interpreters is low, a fact that makes
black-box attacks more difficult than standard classification
attacks. They also presented defense methods against such
attacks. Ghorbani et al. [2019] show that several interpreta-
tion methods are fragile to small perturbations, which change
the produced heatmaps while maintaining the same predic-
tions. They explain this vulnerability as a result of the high
dimensionality and non-linearities in deep networks which
affect gradient-based interpretations; intuitively, two sets of
classes can be separated similarly using different boundaries,
so that the gradients may change and lead to misleading
interpretations. Since their attack method was only tested
against gradient-based interpretations where the prediction of
the model was intact, it is left for future research to determine
whether methods like our LRP version that are not based di-
rectly on gradients are vulnerable as well. If so, then new
intuition and explanation are required for understanding the
effect of such attacks, as well as new defense strategies.
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